Acknowledging the limitations of traditional, mandatory governance instruments (building codes, planning legislation) to achieve low-carbon buildings, governments, firms and other organisations have been experimenting with alternatives. This trend has become known as the 'new governance'. This article brings together 50 new governance instruments to better understand what this new governance for low-carbon buildings looks like, and what may be expected from it. It finds that new governance instruments fall short in exactly the same areas as do traditional instruments. It argues for a change in application of new governance instruments along three paths to improve their performance. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 This new governance fits a broader transition from traditional state-led direct regulatory interventions to governance approaches that allow for a broad inclusion of non-state stakeholders and the use of less-coercive regulatory instruments. Often new governance instruments blend command-and-control type approaches with newer voluntary mechanisms, and they are normally added as complements to existing regulatory frameworks. But what exactly does this new governance for low-carbon buildings look like around the globe? Given the popularity of new governance for low-carbon building development and transformation it is of relevance to understand the scope of the new governance instruments' designs, why they were introduced, how they perform, and whether better outcomes may be expected of them than of traditional building codes and planning legislation.
Introduction
Traditional building codes and planning legislation are ill-suited to accelerate the transition to lowcarbon buildings. The main problems relate to the long time it takes to develop buildings codes and planning legislation; the tendency to exempt existing buildings from complying with new or mandated codes and legislation; and the difficulty of addressing user behaviour through them. In response, governments, firms, and other organisations have been trialling alternative and complementary governance instruments for some decades now. Examples include certification and classification of buildings, new forms of financing, and innovative ways of generating and disseminating information. The larger policy experiment of trialling alternative governance instruments has become known as 'new governance' (Holley, Gunningham, & Shearing, 2012; Wurzel, Zito, & Jordan, 2013) .
This new governance fits a broader transition from traditional state-led direct regulatory interventions to governance approaches that allow for a broad inclusion of non-state stakeholders and the use of less-coercive regulatory instruments. Often new governance instruments blend command-and-control type approaches with newer voluntary mechanisms, and they are normally added as complements to existing regulatory frameworks. But what exactly does this new governance for low-carbon buildings look like around the globe? Given the popularity of new governance for low-carbon building development and transformation it is of relevance to understand the scope of the new governance instruments' designs, why they were introduced, how they perform, and whether better outcomes may be expected of them than of traditional building codes and planning legislation.
This article seeks to map, explore and interrogate this new governance for low-carbon buildings by drawing together insights from 50 new governance instruments from Australia, Asia, Europe and North America. It finds that these are predominantly applied at the very top end of the construction and property sector; that their uptake is limited, particularly in the area of existing buildings; and that they have a strong focus on building technology but appear less interested in changing the behaviour of building users. Building-related energy consumption is split roughly evenly between the residential and commercial property sectors (IPCC, 2014; US Energy Information Administration, 2013- there is some debate about these numbers; for detailed discussions see Majeau-Bettez et. Al, 2011; Crawford & Stephan, 2013) . In short, buildings and how we use them contribute considerably to the process of humaninduced climate change.
At the same time buildings hold a considerable mitigation potential. Technologies and design solutions are available that allow for cost-effective reductions of carbon emissions of 30 to 80 per cent (IPCC, 2014; Mumovic & Santamouris, 2013) . Likewise, much knowledge is available on how changes to building user behaviour can reduce energy consumption and related carbon emissions (Cabinet Office, 2011 ). The question is, then, how to ensure that technology, design solutions, and insights on behavioural change are taken up on a large scale and in a timely manner?
An obvious answer to that question would be: Let governments introduce mandatory requirements. Governments have, after all, a long history of regulating buildings through building codes and planning legislation, and these traditional governance instruments have contributed to a relatively safe and healthy built environment-albeit these privileges are not shared equally around the globe (Taylor, 2013) . And indeed, governments have sought, and to some extent achieved, improved building energy efficiency and reduced building carbon intensity through buildings codes since the 1970s (IEA, 2013) . Unfortunately building codes and planning legislation come with a number of constraints that hamper a rapid and large scale transition towards low-carbon buildings.
To name a few (UN, 2014; UNEP, 2007; World Bank, 2011) :
• It often takes a long time to develop and implement mandatory requirements due to the many checks and balances required to ensure democratic accountability and transparency.
This sometimes results in situations where mandatory requirements cannot keep up with technological developments and hamper their uptake.
• Proposals for change of mandatory regulation easily become politicised due to vested interests and sunk-costs in the construction and property sectors. Policymakers take high risks in proposing ambitious (amendments to) mandatory requirements for low-carbon buildings, and if they do they often face a long process of lobbying and being lobbied.
• The development and implementation of mandatory requirements require substantial institutional capital-knowledgeable policymakers, bureaucrats to process regulations, inspectors to assess building plans and construction work, and so on. Particularly in rapidly developing economies, such institutional capital is often found to be lacking. This is problematic because this is where the fastest growth of the built environment is expected and where mandatory requirements currently are lowest. That being said, the enforcement F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 5 of building energy efficiency codes is also problematic in developed economies because inspectors prioritise classic regulated areas (such as structural safety and healthiness) over the relatively novel area of resource efficiency and carbon intensity.
• New and amended mandatory requirements often exempt existing buildings from compliance-a process known as 'grandfathering'. This is problematic because today's built environment already contributes to unsustainable levels of carbon emissions.
Grandfathering clauses reduce the impact of amended and new mandatory instruments, which is particularly challenging for developed economies. In these economies, the built environment transforms by at best 2 per cent per year-implying that 70 per cent of today's buildings will be still in use in 2050.
• Finally, mandatory requirements address objects-building parts, buildings, precincts-and not the behaviour of people using buildings. It would be unheard of for a government to require its citizens to wear an extra jumper in winter when they feel cold instead of turning up the heating. User behaviour is, however, a key aspect to reduced energy consumption and carbon emissions of the built environment, as discussed above.
A turn to new governance for low-carbon buildings
These problems are acknowledged by governments, firms, and other organisations. Since the early 1990s they have been trialling alternative governance instruments, often as substitutes or compliments to traditional ones. Experimenting with alternative governance instruments is not unique to the area of low-carbon buildings. It fits a logical development in an ongoing philosophy of deregulation, government reforms, and a larger shift in rethinking the role of government in governing society (DeLeon, Rivera, & Manderino, 2010; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2011) . This 'new governance' 1 is particularly strong in the area of environmental and resource sustainability (Holley et al., 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013) . At least three related trends distinguish this new governance from earlier approaches to governance. First, a shift away from sole-government authority in governing environmental problems towards the involvement of public and private sector stakeholders. Second, an interest in governance instruments that encourage self-organisation, market solutions or both as substitutes for or complements to mandatory command-and-control style instruments. Third, a shift towards instruments that reward voluntary compliance as opposed to enforcing mandated 1 Using the term 'new' when pointing out an empirical phenomenon is always risky. After a while it inevitably loses it 'newness'. This is also the case for new governance and new governance instruments: They have been trialled with for more than two decades and some of the new governance instruments studied-certification and classification, for example-have become fairly normal in the governing of low-carbon buildings.
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Interviewees were traced through additional Internet searches and through social-network websites, again particularly LinkedIn. This resulted in a pool of over 200 interviewees from various backgrounds, including policymakers, administrators, architects, engineers, constructors, developers, and investors. The data were processed by means of a systematic coding scheme and qualitative data analysis software (Atlas.ti). By using this approach the data were systematically explored to gain an understanding of the performance of the instruments studied. That said, the insights provided in the article predominantly built on data obtained from websites, existing reports, and other documented sources (for a more extensive discussion of the methodology underlying this research project, see van der Heijden, 2014, 165-175) .
It goes without saying that an article length contribution is too short to discuss each of these 50 instruments in depth. In what follows I therefore introduce the dominant types of instruments and provide examples for illustrative purposes. The online Appendix provides a brief description of each instrument (Table A) and a summary of the main characteristics of the instruments (Table B) ;
for each instrument a hyperlink is provided for interested readers to follow up on (Table A) . 
Certification and classification instruments
The dominant type of new governance instruments for low-carbon buildings is certification and classification (Cole & Valdebenito, 2013; Fowler & Rauch, 2006) . In general, such instruments allow for the assessment of buildings against a number of criteria. If these are met a certificate is issued to indicate compliance. Its application for low-carbon buildings comes with a specific twist:
classification ( • Benchmarking, which indicates that a building, building part, or even building users meet the rules of that instrument. An example is Eco-Office in Singapore; an instrument that assesses 2 LINK TO ONLINE APPENDIX ABOUT HERE.
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Not for circulation or citation • Rating, which uses the relative performance of a building within the set of buildings certified to classify the building within that set. Identifiers such as stars or colours are often used to indicate this relative performance-the higher its relative performance compared to other certified buildings, the higher the number of stars awarded, indicating the specific class of
certification. An example is NABERS (the National Australian Built Environment Rating System). It assess the energy performance or water performance of buildings, and issues certificates in six classes using a star rating to highlight differences among certified buildings.
If a building is certified for energy and water performance, two different certificates are issued.
• Labelling, which builds on a holistic approach to classification. It does not certify energy efficiency or water consumption or carbon intensity individually, but seeks seek to classify buildings based on overall performance. Well known instruments such as BREEAM (BRE
Environmental Assessment Method) and LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design) award credits for different sustainability credentials and the total number of credits awarded is the basis for the class of certification.
Differences in classification might raise information barriers, rather than reduce them.
Various studies highlight that it is next to impossible to compare the performance of distinct certification and classification instruments simply because they are built on a different form of classification, or because the rules underlying the classification system are so diverse that a similar building could achieve a low class of certification in one instrument, but a high class of certification in another (Roderick, McEwan, Wheatley, & Alonso, 2009; Van der Heijden, 2015) .
To complicate things further, different forms of certification exist: 'as designed', 'as built'
and 'in operation'. The first form certifies expected performance of a building design, the second form certifies the performance of a building built in compliance with that design, and the final form certifies achieved performance after a specified period of use-it is often subject to periodical renewal. The first two forms are dominant, and the latter form was developed in response to critiques of these two: buildings are often not built in compliance with their (certified) design; during construction many flaws might be made that instrument administrators or their inspectors do not notice; or user behaviour may undo the low-carbon credentials of a building-all of which could result in a certified design or completed building not meeting its expected performance. Such
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Not for circulation or citation problems are often reported in the literature, as are problems of developers and property owners gaming the instruments by seeking easy but not necessarily low-carbon solutions to achieve high classes of certification (Scofield, 2013) .
Certification and classification instruments have, thus far, achieved most promising results in the area of high-profile new commercial building development (such as offices in central business districts of major cities; Van der Heijden, 2015) . It is here where developers and property owners expect (and get) high returns on their investments. These instruments have thus far been less successful in changing the market for residential buildings and existing buildings-but they also have not had a transformative impact in the area of less prestigious commercial building development (Yudelson & Meyer, 2013) . Moreover, when looked at in relative numbers the overall performance of this type of instruments is not too promising: Even one of the best performing instruments in the world, LEED in the United States, has over the course of 15 years certified less than 4 per cent of all new commercial property developed in that period.
3
Information generation and dissemination instruments
A second type of instruments seeks to generate and disseminate knowledge on how to construct and retrofit low-carbon buildings, and how building users' behaviour can be modified to achieve reduced energy consumption. A typical example is Green Lights in the United States, implemented by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in the early 1990s (EPA, 1994) . Through
Green Lights the Agency sought to overcome initial resistance to and unfamiliarity with energy efficient lightning. It made visible to building users the ease of reducing energy consumption and supported them in generating knowledge relevant for running their business: cost savings. Green
Lights participants committed to installing energy efficient lighting in 90 per cent of their facilitiesbut only where this was profitable to do so. In return the Environmental Protection Agency provided participants with tools (software predominantly) to carry out assessments and keep track of energy savings, helped them connect with lighting retrofitting services, and pointed out potential funding opportunities. Green Lights has witnessed a wide uptake throughout the United States, making it easier for participants to reduce operation costs and to brand themselves as environmentally aware (Moon, Bae, & Jeong, 2014; Videras & Alberini, 2000) . It is now incorporated in Energy Star Buildings, a certification and classification instrument.
Besides supplying information directly from instrument-administrators to instrumentparticipants some instruments challenge participants to generate information on how to develop, retrofit, and use low-carbon buildings and share this information with instrument-administrators 3 Data from www.usgbc.org and www.census.gov (7 July 2015).
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Financing instruments
A third type of new governance instruments for low-carbon buildings are particularly concerned with financing. Property developers and property owners often face difficulties in obtaining funds for the development or retrofitting of low-carbon buildings. Banks and other fund providers are concerned that the additional costs that (may) come with developing low-carbon buildings will not be represented in these buildings' future market value, and fear that lenders will not be able to pay back loans provided. The idea that future financial gains of low-carbon buildings-reduced operation costs, among others-improve these owners' ability to pay back loans does not fit current business models that are based on cash flows from production-and not reduced consumption-and growth (World Bank, 2011) . Likewise, building owners might be concerned they will not see a return on their investments in low-carbon buildings because they do not own a property long enough, or they might 4 Data from www.census.gov (7 July 2015).
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A variety of instruments addresses these issues. Revolving loan funds are one of these.
Revolving loan funds for low-carbon buildings often consist of a sum of money that is lent to property developers and property owners to fund low-carbon building solutions. The assumption is that these solutions result in reduced operation costs of buildings, allowing owners to pay back the loan. Once the fund has recouped the money it can lend it again to others (Boyd, 2013) . 
Accelerators and bridging instruments
A fourth and final type of instruments seeks to accelerate the uptake of the earlier ones discussed, and seeks to bridge different instruments (traditional and new ones) aiming for synergies that make the whole of governance instruments for low-carbon buildings larger than the sum of its parts.
Examples of accelerators are a range of incentives in place that seek to speed up the application of certification and classification instruments such as BREEAM and LEED. Some counties and cities in
North Carolina give density bonuses, for example, to builders who comply with LEED criteria, and other states have in place tax incentives for construction work that receives LEED certification.
Likewise, the Dutch government has in place Sustainable Public Procurement criteria that require that future government buildings or office space needs to be BREEAM certified or meet standards comparable to BREEAM certification. Other examples are the City of New York's 1000
Superintendents and the Australian Supply Chain Sustainability. Both instruments seek to (re)educate specific actors in the construction and property sectors about the advantages of lowcarbon buildings. 1000 Superintendents builds on the assumption that through interactions with property owners and tenants, superintendents might be able to change their mindset about lowcarbon buildings and ways to reduce building energy consumption.
To give an example of a bridging instrument: The participants of the Better Building Partnership in Sydney are experimenting with green leases as a bridge between property owners participating in new governance instruments and tenants participating in other instruments. A green lease is, like any lease, an agreement between a property owner (landlord) and a tenant, but it includes specific clauses about both parties' responsibilities for low-carbon and other (environmental) sustainability credentials of a building. What participants of the Partnership realised is that property owners often need the commitment of their tenants to use a low-carbon building in Singapore-after all, there is only so much they can do through changed user behaviour in terms of energy reduction. Without commitment from the other party, landlords or tenants might refrain from participating in these instruments. By promoting green leases throughout Australia, the participants of the Partnership hope these problems can be overcome (Blundell, 2014) .
Four new governance trends
From exploring and mapping new governance instruments for low-carbon buildings, it has become clear there is no shortage of these instruments. They come in a wide range of designs and are implemented in a variety of settings (see further the online Appendix). At first glance they appear hopeful complements to traditional, mandatory governance instruments such as building codes and planning legislation because they are often tailored to a specific problem, move beyond the onesize-fits-all approach of traditional instruments, and include the relevant actors to address that problem and utilise their tacit knowledge. That being said, the 50 instruments studied point to four trends that raise questions about the overall ability of new governance instruments to accelerate a rapid and large transition to low-carbon buildings (see also Table B in the online Appendix):
• Whilst the number of these new governance instruments is vast, their overall impact is limited. Even the most widely applied instruments, certification and classification instruments such as LEED and BREEAM, have achieved a marginal uptake in their potential market at best. This holds for the vast majority of instruments studied. The vast majority of instruments has not yet been able to move beyond the absolute leaders in the construction and property sectors.
• The majority of instruments studied has a sole focus on or dominant application in the highend of the commercial property market: Office buildings in central business districts of major cities and government owned and leased property. This holds particularly for certification and classification instruments. Whilst these instruments allow for certification of other building types, including residential buildings, they face difficulties penetrating these other markets (Cole & Valdebenito, 2013 ). There appears a clear logic to why new governance instruments are dominant in the high-end of the commercial property-market: These are the buildings commissioned and leased by relatively large firms to whom leadership matters, who have in place social corporate responsibility policies, and who have to justify their behaviour to internal and external stakeholders. They are more likely to demand low-carbon (Dixon, Ennis-Reynolds, Roberts, & Sims, 2009) .
• Whilst the instruments studied focus evenly on new and existing buildings, the uptake of instruments with a focus on existing buildings is worse than for those with a focus on new buildings. Two issues stand out. First, even when a landlord can acquire funds to retrofit a building she might be held back in doing so because of the typical split-incentive problemthe gains of the retrofit come to the tenant, but the landlord has to bear the costs (Hakkinen & Belloni, 2011) . Green leases could help landlords overcome this problem, but financing instruments often have a sole focus on financing retrofits-1200 Buildings in Melbourne and PACE in the United States are typical examples. Second, particularly for small and medium sized firms and households the process of going through a retrofit might be too much trouble to make up for the longer term gains. This 'hassle factor' is not addressed by the instruments studied (cf., Cabinet Office, 2011).
• A final trend that stands out is that the majority of instruments studied seek to reduce the carbon intensity and energy consumption of buildings through technology. Only a few seek improvements through behavioural change of building users. The research did not suggest a clear explanation for this trend. It could be that a larger paradigm of ecological modernisation, popular in many of the countries that provide contexts for these instruments, skews governments, firms, and other organisations towards thinking in terms of technological solutions instead of behavioural ones (Hayden, 2014) . Another explanation is that most instruments focus on 'per square meter' performance of a building, and not on a 'per capita' basis (Janda, 2011; Stephan & Crawford, 2014) . 6 A less prosaic explanation would be that firms producing technological solutions drive the new governance agenda because they have a strong interest in seeing this type of instrument implemented. Future research may wish to further explore this area.
Conclusion and discussion: Beyond the limitations of new governance for low-carbon buildings
It goes without saying that the findings presented should be considered in the light of the approach taken to the research. The 50 instruments studied built on a stratified sample. It is likely that a broader variety of instruments may be found than the four ideal types discussed in this article. The paper is further biased towards discussing instruments from Australia and the United Statesroughly 60 per cent of instruments discussed are from these two countries (see Table A in the online 6 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.
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Does this imply the new governance for low-carbon buildings should be considered a failed policy experiment? I think not. It has provided leaders in the construction and property sectors a context and means to showcase the possibilities in terms of low-carbon buildings. A wealth of bestpractices is now available that evidence the possibilities to design, construct, and use buildings in ways that result in considerable lower carbon emissions than conventional practice. These buildings and the media attention generated by new governance instruments help to change norms in the construction and property sectors and help to make low-carbon buildings less alien (Yudelson & Meyer, 2013) .
A shortcoming of new governance for low-carbon buildings, as a larger policy experiment, is that the focus has predominantly been on generating and showcasing leadership in the construction and property sectors. Time and again the mission statements of the instruments stress the need of illustrating that low-carbon buildings that move well beyond conventional practice are possiblewhether at net-cost benefit, with existing technology, within existing legal settings, through changed behaviour, or otherwise (see the various links to webpages in the online Appendix). What the instruments have in general failed to do, however, is think beyond attracting leaders and explore how they can move from leaders to other players in the construction and property sectors. At the end of the day it is relevant that the masses make a change, and not the leaders only.
How then can new governance instruments be used to accelerate a large scale transition to low-carbon buildings? I see three complementary paths. The first is to rethink their purpose. The current generation of instruments is pre-occupied with generating and showcasing leadership, a second generation of instruments might wish to focus on taking the next step: Moving from leaders to other players. Future research may seek to better understand why other players are less enthusiastic about the new governance instruments. Do they face different barriers than leaders?
Are they less interested than leaders? Do they need different incentives than leaders? 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The third path is to think more carefully about the interaction between new governance instruments and existing policy mixes. Where can they contribute or fill in gaps? Can positive synergies between new governance instruments and existing regulation be designed, and if so, how?
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